Parallel Paths: Canada-Australian Relations since the 1890s

By Greg Donaghy

In the last quarter of the 19th-century, the vast physical and psychological distances that separated Canada and the six Australian colonies suddenly narrowed. Victorian England's string of imperial successes in Africa and Asia - victories that gave London control over a quarter of the globe and over a third of its people - sparked a wave of romantic enthusiasm for the empire. This was particularly true in Canada, where economic stagnation, French-English tension, and the lure of easy American wealth caused some to doubt the young country's capacity to survive on its own. By the mid-1880s, as the Canadian Pacific Railway wove its final few miles through the Rocky Mountains to the edge of the Pacific, a number of influential Canadians began to envision the new railway as an integral part of a network that would unite Britain with its Asian empire. Throughout the decade, as Canada settled its western provinces and looked outward across the Pacific, popular support for an "All-Red Route" that would link Canada by cable and steamship to Australasia grew steadily.

Reluctant Relations: 1886-1939

The romance of empire made a much smaller impression on the Canadian government. Nevertheless, it was soon forced to consider its relations with the Australian colonies. A slump in world trade, unrelenting pressure from Vancouver logging interests, and the persistent arguments advanced by Sir Sandford Fleming, a leading advocate of the Pacific cable, prompted it to accord the colonies a new importance. In May 1893, cabinet agreed to give an Australian, James Huddart, a £25,000 subsidy to operate a regular steamship service between Canada and New South Wales. Shortly after, Canada's first minister of trade and commerce, Mackenzie Bowell, agreed to lead a delegation to Australia to seek new markets for Canadian exports. He was not optimistic. "I do not," he wrote on the eve of his departure, "anticipate any great immediate results from our visit to Australia. The parties with whom we have been estranged so long can scarcely be brought into a close relationship at a moment's notice."1

Bowell was surprised by his warm reception in Australia and following his return to Canada in the winter of 1894, the government reached two decisions designed to enhance Canada's relations with Britain's Pacific colonies: first, it agreed to convene a colonial conference in the summer of 1894; and second, it resolved to send John Short Larke to Australia as Canada's first trade commissioner.2

Ottawa's expectations were soon frustrated. At the 1894 Colonial Conference in Ottawa, which attracted representatives from the six Australian colonies, New Zealand, Fiji and Britain, Canada's proposal to strengthen imperial trade relations through a system of British preferential tariffs was effectively defeated when opposed by the two largest Australian colonies, New South Wales and Queensland. The Canadian initiative, worried the two suspicious colonies, seemed designed to undermine Australia's protective tariffs.

Arriving in Australia in January 1895, Larke found his task equally challenging. A protectionist press welcomed the Canadian trade commissioner by warning its readers that "[t]he measure of [Larke's] continuous success will also be the measure of our suicidal folly."3 Only New South Wales heeded his pleas to help Ottawa subsidize Huddart's struggling steamship line. The Eastern Extension Company, which operated a telegraph service linking Australia to Egypt and thence to Europe, promoted widespread opposition to the whole idea of a Pacific Cable. The only sign of Australian interest in trade with Canada disappeared abruptly when exploratory talks between Larke and the premier of Victoria were suspended pending Australian federation.

Still, from the Canadian perspective, there seemed every reason to persevere. Despite initial financial reverses, the Canadian-Australian Steamship Line managed to establish a regular shipping service. Bilateral trade, though still minuscule, slowly increased as a result. Canadian exports to Australia - principally timber, canned salmon and manufactured farm implements - tripled in value between 1892 and 1900. Moreover, Canada enjoyed a tidy surplus: in 1900, it exported over $1.6 million worth of goods to Australia in exchange for imports worth only $660,000.4 At the same time, the six Australian colonies began to moderate their opposition to the Pacific cable. Facilitated by regular steamship and cable connections, commerce between the two British dominions seemed certain to expand following the federation of the Australian colonies in January 1901. Canada's Liberal prime minister, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, was encouraged by Canadian exporters to take advantage of these developments and appointed a second trade commissioner to Australia in 1903.

The new trade commissioner, D.H. Ross, made little progress with the Australians. Most of Australia's exports to Canada were agricultural and so were already admitted free of duty; it had little need for the kind of broad reciprocal trade deal desired by the Laurier government. Instead, Australia suggested that the two countries negotiate an agreement that covered a very limited number of items. Protectionist sentiment, whose influence on Australian policy was magnified by a series of unstable minority governments, further complicated negotiations. These dragged on inconclusively for much of the decade, slowly straining Canada's patience. When Australia failed to respond promptly to a 1909 offer to conclude a treaty on the narrow basis it favoured, Ross erupted with exasperation:

From several successive Ministers, I have heard [such] strong expressions of sympathy towards the desires of the Canadian Government in regard to preferential trade that I am almost inclined to think that such sentiments are nothing more than empty platitudes.5

Laurier shared his trade commissioner's indignation and as trade relations with the United States began to show evidence of a new vigour, he became less interested in concluding a trade agreement with Australia.

Few Australians were probably surprised by Laurier's change of heart; many were already convinced that "within a few years Canada [would] either be an independent republic or an integral part of the United States."6 Indeed, with their broad Yankee accents and populist attitudes, Canadians seemed more American than British. Canada's efforts to reconcile these two influences on its national life increasingly led to friction with Australia over the nature of relations within the Empire. The imperial outlook that fostered Canada's interest in Australia also spawned a number of proposals for some form of imperial federation. Advocates of such schemes pointed out that federation would allow the dominions an opportunity to reconcile their interests with imperial foreign and defence policy. In exchange, they would assume a small share of the financial burden associated with defending the empire.

In Australia, particularly after the South African War, this imperialist vision was embraced with considerable sympathy. Isolated by the vast Pacific Ocean - where German, French and Japanese imperialism seemed to roam unchecked - imperial federation offered Australia an opportunity to ensure that its interests were kept front and centre when British decision-makers tinkered with the disposition of the empire's naval resources. Canadians, on the other hand, were disillusioned by the Boer War and were increasingly alarmed by the notion of imperial federation. The country's significant French-Canadian minority, profoundly North American in outlook and sceptical of Britain's imperial mission, viewed the imperial connection as a trap whose only purpose was to force the self-governing dominions to assume greater responsibility for imperial defence.

By common consent, the prime ministers of Britain's self-governing dominions skirted this contentious issue at the 1902 colonial conference. The question, however, could not be avoided indefinitely. Frustrated by his repeated inability to persuade Britain to eject France from its possessions in the New Hebrides, the Australian prime minister, Alfred Deakin, arrived in London for the 1907 Colonial Conference determined to change the very basis on which the empire was organized. He proposed that the conference create an Imperial Council that would assume responsibility for the general shape of imperial defence and foreign policy. A secretariat would carry out agreed policy and facilitate communications between meetings. Laurier was unconvinced. Aware that closer imperial relations would inflame French Canadian opinion, Laurier charged the Australian with endangering dominion self-government. The debate raged for days, but Laurier, whom Deakin later denounced for his "fifth-rate part in the Conference", defiantly stood his ground.7

For the moment, this fundamental difference over how the empire might be organized precluded close relations. Even the election in 1911 of a Conservative and imperially-minded prime minister, Sir Robert Borden, had little immediate impact on Canada's wary approach to imperial issues. However, the swirling passions that accompanied the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914 swept away many Canadian doubts about the value of the Empire. The country plunged into battle alongside Australia and the other overseas dominions. The war revived the debate over imperial organization. This time, Canada and Australia were firmly united in pursuit of identical goals.

The war placed dominion governments in an awkward position. Although they remained responsible for the nature of their national contribution to the allied cause, Britain retained complete control over strategy and high policy. During the initial stages of the conflict, when it was thought that the war would only last a few months, this state of affairs was perfectly acceptable. But as the war dragged on and its horrifying scale became apparent, a number of dominion premiers became restive and uneasy. During a visit to London in 1915, Borden began to wage a campaign intended to force the British government to keep the dominions more fully informed of the war's progress. Early the following year, the newly-elected Australian prime minister, W.M. Hughes, joined Borden's crusade. After a brief meeting in Ottawa, the two agreed on a broadly similar set of dominion objectives.

Borden and Hughes proved a formidable team. They readily convinced the wily British prime minister, David Lloyd George, of the need to establish formal mechanisms to facilitate consultation between Britain and the dominions. An Imperial War Conference invited dominion prime ministers to consider the general problem of imperial relations, while an Imperial War Cabinet gave them a direct voice in the conduct of the war. The initial struggle for greater dominion status was successfully concluded in April 1917 when the Imperial War Conference recognized "the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth... [with a right to] an adequate voice in foreign policy and foreign relations."8 A year later, this theoretical expression of dominion sovereignty assumed practical significance when Borden and Hughes joined forces again to secure separate dominion representation at the Paris Peace Conference.

The success enjoyed by Hughes and Borden in demonstrating that British and dominion interests could be accommodated within a single imperial foreign policy, provided a temporary basis for continued Australian-Canadian cooperation. From the start, however, the postwar relationship was tense. Hughes approached the Paris peace talks determined to enhance Australian security by annexing Papua New Guinea. Borden was preoccupied with maintaining, as the one positive result of the war, continued Anglo-American cooperation. A breach in the Canadian-Australian relationship over the fate of Germany's Pacific colonies was only narrowly averted when officials devised a compromise that satisfied both Hughes' desire to annex New Guinea and Borden's wish not to alienate an American president who was committed to the principle of self-determination.

Borden's successor as prime minister, Arthur Meighen, was not so lucky. There could be no disguising the differences that divided Australia and Canada over the question of renewing the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902. In Australian eyes, this mutual defence pact remained the best, and perhaps the only effective, guarantee against Japanese aggression. However, Washington strongly opposed the treaty, which effectively excluded it from a major role in policing the Pacific. Renewing the alliance would almost certainly strain Anglo-American relations and force Canada into the untenable position of having to choose between its two major allies. Given the issues at stake, Meighen and Hughes arrived in London for the 1921 Imperial Conference, each resolved to have his own way.

Hughes opened the conference by defiantly insisting on the treaty's immediate renewal. Over the course of the next few days, the Australian cause was championed by an array of British imperial talent that included Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, and Arthur Balfour, the Lord President of the Council. Undaunted, Meighen charged dramatically ahead. Canada, he declared, had "a special right to be heard," for, in the event of war between the United States and the Empire, Canada "[would] be the Belgium." No possible form of this treaty, he continued, would satisfy the United States. The Empire had no choice but to scrap the offending treaty.9

The Australian prime minister was outraged. He questioned Meighen's interpretation of American opinion; he objected to having imperial policy dictated by Washington; and he scornfully dismissed American naval power. He poured ridicule on the unfortunate Canadian:

What does he [Meighen] offer us? Something we can grasp? What is the substantial alternative to the renewal of the Treaty? The answer is none...Now let me speak plainly to Mr. Meighen on behalf of Australia...If he will look at his own [defence] budget and ours he will see what it means to have a great nation like America as his neighbour, under whose wing the Dominion of Canada can nestle safely...I must regard Mr. Meighen's presentation of the case as not the case for the Empire, but as the case for the United States of America.10

With his conference now in jeopardy, Lloyd George quickly removed the question from the agenda. But in the end, the Canadian view prevailed. At the Washington Conference in 1921, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was replaced with a virtually unenforceable set of multilateral disarmament agreements designed to strengthen Pacific stability. These were cold comfort in Australia, where the Canadian victory rankled for a long time to come.

Any possibility that the rift between Canada and Australia might be repaired evaporated with the election of W.L. Mackenzie King as Canada's tenth prime minister in December 1921. A Liberal protege of Laurier, King shared the former prime minister's determination to avoid external entanglements that would weaken the bonds that held together French and English Canada. Despite his cautious temperament and his relative inexperience, King boldly seized every opportunity during his first year in office to assert Canada's authority over its foreign policy. When it was decided to convene an imperial conference in the spring of 1923, King resolved to use the occasion to repudiate the whole notion of an imperial foreign policy. The prospect of challenging the British Empire during his first overseas assignment filled the self-effacing prime minister with dread. "I am filled with terror," he confided to his diary, "at the thought of having to speak many times and [at] my inability to work out themes."11

What King lacked as a public speaker, he more than made up for in dogged persistence. No sooner had Lord Curzon introduced the question of imperial foreign policy than the Canadian prime minister rose in his place to declare his government's intention to "pursue a foreign policy of its own."12 He was immediately confronted by the new Australian prime minister. Tall, handsome and athletic, Stanley M. Bruce was the perfect foil for the middle-aged and drab Mackenzie King. Vigorously, Bruce rejected the idea that each part of the Empire might shape a foreign policy of its own. "If the discussion continues on the present basis," he exclaimed, "we are going to achieve nothing at all with regard to consultation on foreign affairs."13

That, of course, was precisely King's objective, and as the conference proceeded, he opposed every effort to reach agreed positions on individual questions of foreign and defence policy. In these detailed discussions, King and Bruce clashed once again. The Australian's repeated efforts to secure Canadian support for a resolution endorsing Britain's plans for the defence of Singapore and the Suez Canal were turned aside. By the end of the conference, King's victory was complete. In a final burst of activity, he amended the meeting's concluding resolution on foreign relations to reflect his conviction that imperial conferences were consultative not policy-making bodies. King's success ended the experiment with a common foreign policy and signalled the emergence of the modern Commonwealth. It also added to the growing gulf separating Canada and Australia.

King's attitude towards the Empire was incomprehensible to many Australian observers. The young R.G. Casey, then serving as an Australian liaison officer in London, watched the Canadian prime minister with bewildered fascination:

Surely no one man can claim credit for having done so much as Mackenzie King to damage what remains in these autonomous days of the fabric of the British Empire. His efforts to make political capital out of his domestic nationalism are analogous to a vandal who pulls down a castle in order to build a cottage.14

The subject of trade, which was increasingly bound up in the debate over the imperial connection, was equally divisive. The failure to conclude a commercial treaty had not materially harmed bilateral trade. Indeed, the war provided a tremendous boost to the sale of Canadian forestry products, metal manufactures and auto parts in Australia. However, access to this market, which became more important as a postwar recession deprived Canada of its American sales, was threatened. In 1921, Australia introduced steep new tariffs on Canadian newsprint at the same time as it announced its readiness to conclude trade treaties with members of the British Empire. In October 1922, Mackenzie King's minister of trade and commerce, James Robb, set out for Australia in renewed pursuit of a bilateral trade agreement.

The Australians proved to be tough bargainers. As was the case during earlier rounds of negotiations, there was little incentive for them to conclude a reciprocal trade agreement. Australian officials also resented Mackenzie King's reluctance to seek a broad imperial solution to the postwar slump in trade. In their view any agreement with Canada would merely assist American subsidiaries operating in the dominion at the expense of companies from Britain. For over two years, the discussions dragged on before Canadian negotiators were forced to give in to Australian demands in order to preserve the market for British Columbia's forestry products. In exchange for receiving important concessions on canned salmon, auto parts and paper, Canada reduced its duties on Australian meat and butter and increased the margin of preference enjoyed by Australian dried fruit.

The 1925 agreement was soon the source of some controversy. It was strenuously opposed by Canadian farmers, who feared new competition from imported Australian meat and butter. Canada's conciliatory prime minister fretted about the accord which caused this noisy debate and condemned the minister responsible. Mackenzie King's liberal philosophy was offended by the prospect of raising Canadian tariffs on imports from third countries in order to give Australia an increased margin of preference for dried fruit. Moreover, these provisions were aimed primarily at the United States just as trade between the two North American countries had begun to recover. The prime minister gave the accord only lukewarm support, and no sooner had the agreement been approved than he delighted in crippling one of its main provisions. An Australian program to promote the export of butter was found guilty on a technicality of violating Canada's anti-dumping legislation in early 1926. King rejected the Australian prime minister's repeated pleas for understanding and insisted on imposing punitive duties. When, later in the decade, a slump in international trade began to pinch at Canadian exports to the United States, F.L. McDougall, a close advisor to the Australian prime minister, gleefully waited for depression "to drive Mackenzie King into a much more helpful attitude towards Empire economic cooperation."15 In anticipation, perhaps, Australia appointed its first trade commissioner to Canada, R.A. Haynes, in 1929.

Within a year, depression had indeed arrived, and Canadian voters had dismissed Mackenzie King. From the opposition benches, he watched the new, Conservative prime minister, R.B. Bennett, embrace suggestions for an imperial trading bloc. Enthusiasm for imperial preferences surged through the 1930 Imperial Conference and, before the formal discussions had ended, Canada and Australia had agreed to seek a closer trading arrangement. Negotiations were speedy and painless. On his way home from London, the Australian minister for markets and transport, Parker John Maloney, stopped in Ottawa to explore the new agreement's main features. He and Bennett agreed that it would rest on two principles: first, domestic producers in fields where the two countries were competitors would be given adequate protection; second, "a strong effort should be made by each Dominion to divert to the other goods which it did not produce and was currently importing from foreign countries."16

Under the terms of the 1931 trade agreement, Canada was accorded the benefits of Australia's British preferential tariff on 425 out of the 433 items in the Australian tariff.17 Canada also secured important concessions on timber and agricultural implements. In return, Canada extended to Australia the benefits of its own British preferential tariff and increased the margins of preference enjoyed by Australian raisins and currants. The agreement's impact on bilateral trade was dramatic but one-sided. Between 1931 and 1935, Canadian exports to Australia almost tripled, and Canada's share of the Australian market jumped from 2.3% in 1931 to 5.7% in 1935.18 Not surprisingly, Canada opened a second trade commissioner's office in Australia in 1936.

Australian trade did not fare nearly so well under the new agreement. Between 1931 and 1935, Australian exports to Canada increased by less than 50%. Some important Australian exports, including butter, meat and canned fruit, actually declined during this period. Australia pressed Ottawa to extend the agreement but met with little success. Australia's discontent with Canadian trade policy increased sharply when Mackenzie King was re-elected in 1935. The depression had strengthened Mackenzie King's traditional opposition to imperial preferences, and he was anxious to seek freer trade with the United States. The 1935 Canada-United States trade agreement, which diminished the value of Australia's preference on dried fruit, was hardly calculated to endear Canada to Australian policy-makers, whose devotion to imperial preferences remained undiminished. In the spring of 1936, Canada paid the price for its poor reputation in Canberra when Australia unveiled its new "trade diversion policy". In an ill-fated effort to secure its markets in Britain and to balance its trade with the United States, Australia proposed drastically limiting its imports. Worried that Canada might become an alternate source for restricted American products, Australia included Canada in its program. "Here," declared Canada's outraged under-secretary of state for external affairs, "[was] economic nationalism with a vengeance."19

The dispute over "trade diversion" quickly subsided when Washington convinced the Australian cabinet to abandon its policy. The episode remained a disturbing reminder of the sharp differences that continued to divide Canada and Australia in their approaches to the world around them. Neither the ravages of the depression nor the growing threat to world peace posed by German and Japanese aggression in the late 1930s provided sufficient incentive for overcoming the divisions created a decade earlier. As the international situation deteriorated during the 1930s, Canada suggested that the two countries exchange high commissioners in order to encourage a closer "exchange of views". These proposals were rejected as "inopportune".20 Now was not the time, contended Australia, to explore new forms of representation that might further impair Britain's ability to speak with authority for the Empire. Canada's small diplomatic service, steeped in the country's emerging nationalist ethos, scoffed at this "colonial" attitude.21

Australian officials in turn were inclined to belittle Canadian efforts to shape a foreign policy independent of Britain. The preeminent symbol of Canada's efforts to chart a distinctive course, the country's burgeoning foreign ministry, was dismissed by an Australian observer, as useless and futile:

[the Canadians] have built up a big Department of External Affairs and a numerous series of Missions abroad with very little use or effect, for my very definite impression is that they get very little if any more information in spite of their Mission[s] than we get depending as we do on the Foreign Office, and that they have no policy on any subject except to do nothing or say nothing for fear that they may do or say the wrong thing.22

This was certainly not an unfair caricature of Canadian policy. Mackenzie King, aware of the strain that depression and the threat of war placed on national unity, studiously avoided international commitments. Canada's fate, he insisted, would be decided by Parliament alone. The Canadian attitude was unsettling and seemed to indicate that Canada no longer shared Australia's interest in co-operating with the British Commonwealth, a suspicion which seemed confirmed by the meagre results of the 1937 Imperial Conference. On the eve of war, Mackenzie King stood fast against Australia and its prime minister's efforts to secure a final declaration of imperial solidarity.

Awkward Allies: 1939-1968

Mackenzie King's ambiguous attitude towards Britain and its Empire disappeared with the outbreak of war in September 1939. A united Canada hurried to join Australia at Britain's side. The war heralded a new era in Canadian-Australian relations and gave the partnership an increasingly important political character. This transformation began smoothly. In the first days of the war, Canada renewed its suggestion that the two countries exchange high commissioners and Australia readily approved of a step that now appeared to affirm imperial unity. A businessman and former minister of defence, Sir William Glasgow, was quickly sent to Ottawa to head the new mission. At the same time, the Australian and Canadian high commissioners in London, S.M. Bruce and Vincent Massey respectively, took the lead in organizing support for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, the centrepiece of Canada's early war effort. This gesture of Commonwealth solidarity, under which some 9,400 Australian airmen trained in Canada, did not go unappreciated. "The possibility of promoting better relations and more much better now than it was two years ago," Canada's first high commissioner to Australia, Charles Burchell, reported in May 1941.23

Burchell's optimism was premature. Japan's entry into the war in December 1941 created widespread fear in Australia that the country might be overrun. Canada's apparent lack of interest in the Pacific War drew considerable criticism in the Australian press. Misled by Burchell's inexperienced successor, Major-General Victor Odlum, into believing that Canada was ready to assist Australia with men and munitions, the Australian Minister of External Affairs, Herbert Evatt, submitted an anxious request for help. Constrained by its war effort in Europe, Ottawa was unable to respond positively. Undeterred, the minister renewed his plea during a brief visit to Ottawa in April 1942. Again, despite some initially favourable indications, Canada could not meet the Australian request.

Evatt was bitterly disappointed. Ottawa's subsequent decision to provide Britain with a billion dollars to purchase supplies added to his growing sense of grievance. When he encountered the Canadian charge d'affairs a few days later, the minister exploded. The Australian's outburst was vividly described in a telegram to Ottawa:

It was a short but stormy interview. Dr. Evatt was in a very bad temper and referred to Canadians in general and the Canadian Government in particular in most offensive terms, using extremely foul language. He launched into a diatribe against Canada...He suggested that Canada was tied to Mr. Churchill's apron strings, and complained of what he regarded as Canada's empty gestures to Australia.24

Canadian assistance, when it was finally offered as part of Canada's multilateral Mutual Aid program in May 1943, did little to improve Australia's view of its Commonwealth colleague. Ottawa insisted that Australia agree to reduce its tariffs and trade barriers at the end of the war before it would actually send any aid. Only after a good deal of bickering did the two countries manage to effect a compromise in early 1944.

These bilateral tensions were partly moderated by the web of personal relationships that the war spawned between officials in the two governments. As a result, recalled one Canadian diplomat, "[t]here developed a collaboration in international organizations so habitual that it was taken for granted by the 1950s."25 These officials quickly discovered a mutual interest in making certain that the concerns of the small and middle powers in the postwar international system were not ignored by the great powers. Canada and Australia, however, differed on how to achieve this. For the Australian prime minister, John Curtin, the solution lay in transforming the Commonwealth into an institution that would rival the major powers in stature and influence. Canadian officials were suspicious of suggestions for closer Commonwealth consultation, which they feared might limit Canada's flexibility in dealing with the United States. Mackenzie King took an even dimmer view of Curtin's ideas. Such notions, he fumed, were part of a "deliberate design... to revive an imperialism which left the Dominions something less than national sovereignty" and represented "an attack on his personal position."26

The difference in approach was even greater at the United Nations where Evatt enjoyed a free hand in shaping Australian policy. The outspoken and combative foreign minister preferred to attack head-on the privileges enjoyed by the great powers. At the U.N.'s founding conference in San Francisco in 1945, he stubbornly opposed every clause in the U.N.'s charter that seemed to weaken the new organization or that gave the major powers undue influence. While some Canadian officials quietly admired Evatt's determination to strengthen the U.N., most were dismayed by his confrontational tactics. As Cold War tensions reduced the likelihood that the great powers would achieve a sufficient level of cooperation to ensure the survival of the U.N., discretion seemed the greater part of valour:

Our view [observed a senior Canadian official] is that it is better to take the Organization that we can get and, having come to that decision, to refrain from further efforts to pry apart that difficult unity which the Great Powers have attained. This means foregoing the luxury of making any more perfectionist speeches.27

This difference in approach was so profound that Mackenzie King refused to meet Evatt to discuss their views on the great powers' efforts to secure a veto in the Security Council. Instead, he sent his heir apparent, the stately and dignified minister of justice, Louis St. Laurent. The meeting was unsuccessful. Evatt considered St. Laurent "a pawn in a move to defeat the Australian case" and dismissed him as "an American stooge."28

The bilateral relationship remained tense during the immediate postwar period. This partly reflected the disruptive influence of Evatt, who continued to irritate Canadian diplomats and politicians. His success at pressing Australia's claim to the "Commonwealth" seat on the U.N.'s first Security Council in 1946 was particularly galling. More significantly, this tension reflected very different security concerns. Australia, haunted by the spectre of a reconstructed Japan, was anxious to press ahead with a peace settlement that would remove this threat. At a conference in Canberra in September 1947 it sought the support of its Commonwealth partners to push the process ahead. Ottawa, however, was dismayed by the Australian bid to re-fashion a Commonwealth bloc. Washington was almost certain to resent the Australian demarche, which seemed likely to jeopardize Anglo-American cooperation as the cold war erupted in Europe. This sharp geographic difference in focus, which only increased in 1948 when Canada joined in the discussions that resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, diminished the possibility of bilateral cooperation. Indeed, by the late-1940s, relations were so strained that they became the object of gentle derision in Ottawa. After a meeting with Princess Elizabeth and the infant Prince Charles, Lester Pearson confessed to his diary the "hope that relations... were not further disturbed by the fact that I was able to make the baby laugh while [J.B.] Chifley [Curtin's successor as prime minister] was not."29

The triumph of communism in China and the outbreak of war along the Korean Peninsula in June 1950 transformed the postwar landscape. The Cold War spilled beyond its European origins and emerged as a global phenomenon with a unique Asian dimension. Once again, Australian and Canadian troops found themselves fighting together, this time in Korea under the auspices of the United Nations. However, good relations remained elusive. The defeat of Chifley's Labour government and the election of Robert Menzies' conservative coalition threatened to make things worse. Ottawa worried that the new government's aggressive anti-communism and its increasingly suspicious attitude towards Indonesia might inhibit the West's ability to secure cold war allies among Asia's newly independent states.30 Australia was equally critical of Canada's cautious approach to the desperate challenges facing Asia. Percy Spender, the coalition's first minister of external affairs, held Canada partly responsible for the frustrating delays he encountered in establishing an aid program for South-east Asia. Spender's "brutal and eccentric" tactics in pursuit of what eventually became the Colombo Plan were deeply resented in Ottawa.31

The tense international situation left little room for such disputes. Growing allied tension over the strategy to be pursued in response to Chinese intervention in the Korean War threatened the Anglo-American harmony upon which both Canada's and Australia's foreign policy was predicated. A new Australian minister of external affairs, R.G. Casey, set out to tackle this problem when he was appointed to his post in the spring of 1951. An experienced diplomat, who had served in both London and Washington, Casey possessed a clear conception of the role that Canada and Australia might play in the Anglo-American relationship. He lost no time in making Pearson aware of his views:

There is a wide field of potential co-operation and understanding between Australia and Canada, in which our two countries, working together, could be an effective force for the reconciliation of interests between the United States and Britain and an element of stability in the United Nations and the world in general.32

Although Pearson was amused by Casey's "old Etonian, striped-pants manner," he was charmed and impressed by the Australian's "almost Boswellian ingenuousness."33 Pearson's advisers in Ottawa, where Casey regularly visited en route to and from the United Nations, were also captivated by the Australian's "forthcoming and pleasant manner."34

The close relationship that developed between Casey and Pearson provided the basis for a stable partnership whose effects lasted well into the 1960s. For the Australian foreign minister, whose country's isolated location prompted an enduring fear that its Anglo-American allies might become too focused on the Soviet threat in Europe, Pearson became an important source of information on developments in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In exchange, Casey regularly sent Pearson copies of his confidential diaries containing frank comments on his travels through Asia and on discussions in the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). A succession of crises in Asia provided a host of opportunities for bilateral cooperation. For instance, when Canada agreed to sit on the three international control commissions established in 1954 as part of an effort to contain conflict in Indo-China, contacts between Australian and Canadian representatives became "very close and continual."35 Casey and Pearson also came to form the core of a small group of powers that quietly sought a solution to one of the principal obstacles to Asian stability, Communist China's continued exclusion from the international community.

The interest each minister exhibited in the other's country fostered the development of the relationship. By the mid-1950s, there was a flurry of new bilateral activity. In 1954, for example, the two countries' departments of immigration, aware that each confronted similar problems in settling the wave of postwar European immigrants, established the first of many inter-governmental exchange programs. At the same time, stimulated by the postwar economic boom, officials began to dismantle those tax barriers that discouraged investors from seeking new investment opportunities in the other country. By the end of the decade, Canadian direct investment in Australia had more than doubled.36

Not everyone seemed aware of these promising developments. In a 1956 opinion poll, for example, only 22% of Canadians could identify the Australian capital. Australians were only slightly better informed; 26% correctly named Ottawa as the capital of Canada.37 Flush with grants from a youthful Canada Council, however, academics from each country were drawn to the study of the other. Industry, too, was aware of the changes in the relationship. In 1955, James Duncan, the president of the Canadian farm machinery manufacturer, Massey-Harris-Ferguson, drew together a blue-ribbon panel of Canadian and Australian business executives to promote economic and cultural cooperation. The quickening pace of bilateral relations attracted the attention of Pearson's cabinet colleagues. In 1955, Canada's ubiquitous "minister of everything", C.D. Howe, visited Australia in his capacity as deputy prime minister. Howe's visit, which led to a 1959 agreement on nuclear cooperation, heralded a slow but steady stream of Canadian visitors that culminated in 1958 when John Diefenbaker became the first Canadian prime minister to visit Australia.

A good many of these visitors were struck by Australia's potential as a market for Canadian products. Canadian exports had remained stagnant for most of the 1950s, constrained by the import restrictions that Australia imposed to protect sterling's weak foreign exchange position. This hiatus gave the booming Australian economy an opportunity to redress its perpetual trade deficit with Canada and exports to Canada doubled during the decade.38 As Australia gradually liberalized its import regulations in the late 1950s, there were grounds to hope that the warm political partnership might secure preferential access for Canadians to this strong economy. After two years of discussions, which were complicated by Canadian efforts to protect its dairy and agricultural industries, a new trade agreement with most of the substantive provisions found in its 1931 predecessor, came into effect in June 1960. When combined with Australia's decision to lift the last of its import restrictions, its effect on trade was dramatic. In three years, Canadian exports to Australia almost doubled from $54.2 million in 1959 to $105 million in 1962. By 1964, they had jumped to almost $146 million.39

While commercial relations grew progressively closer during the 1960s, the two countries' political objectives began to diverge. In part, this was caused by the changing importance the postwar Commonwealth played in each country's foreign policy. The Australian prime minister seemed especially unhappy with the modern Commonwealth. The accession of large numbers of Asian and African countries had destroyed the comfortable club of the inter-war period. In Menzies' view, the Commonwealth had been "modernized out of existence" and transformed into something that "no longer expresses unity but exists chiefly to ventilate differences."40

In contrast, Canada embraced the boisterous and multiracial Commonwealth as an integral part of its foreign policy. It promised the more established country a forum in which to exercise its influence and offered access to new perspectives on international developments. There was never any question that Ottawa would risk its standing in this new Commonwealth by trying to ease Australia's growing isolation. By 1961, for instance, Canada was prepared to help force South Africa out of the Commonwealth despite clear indications that such action would strain its relations with Australia. Similarly, Ottawa rejected Menzies' efforts in the spring of 1963 to foster closer bilateral relations lest other members of the Commonwealth, particularly India and Pakistan, feel excluded.

The 1960s introduced a second uncomfortable factor into the relationship - the war in Vietnam. Since the Second World War, Australia had come to depend on the United States, as the foremost western power in the Pacific, for its security. This new relationship was initially rooted in the 1951 Pacific Security Agreement and subsequently defined through their common membership in SEATO. As the 1950s progressed, Australia increasingly shared Washington's determination to contain communist expansion in Asia; like Washington, it found itself slowly dragged into the quagmire in South-east Asia. By 1967, the handful of advisers that Australia had sent to South Vietnam five years earlier had become almost a full combat division.

Australia's growing attachment to Washington's Asian policy had a profound impact on relations with Canada. As Canberra's capacity and inclination to function as a middle power began to decline under the weight of its alliance with the United States, Canadian officials assigned less importance to the relationship. Moreover, Asia began to emerge as an active source of continuing bilateral tension. Canada had always been sceptical of applying the European doctrine of containment to Asia. By the mid-1960s, Canadian scepticism had changed to opposition as the strategy failed and conflict flared in Vietnam. The Canadian secretary of state for external affairs, Paul Martin, was soon embroiled in the search for an end to the war in Vietnam. His efforts, which included an ill-fated initiative to bring Peking's influence to bear on the U.N.'s deliberations, were deeply resented in Canberra. Australians wondered why their former ally was no longer fighting beside them in defence of freedom. Sadly, recorded the Canadian high commissioner in 1968, the war in Vietnam had come to "impose an emotional barrier between us."41

Pacific Partners: 1968-1995

With the election of Pierre Trudeau as prime minister in the spring of 1968, there were some grounds to hope that the obstacles to harmonious bilateral relations with Australia might quickly be removed. The new prime minister had long been critical of Canadian foreign policy and the disproportionate amount of attention it seemed to lavish on the United States and Western Europe. Canada would be better served by a "pragmatic and realistic" foreign policy which extended the nation's diplomacy beyond its traditional range. Though Trudeau made it clear that he intended to recognize the Peoples' Republic of China, he insisted that this was only part of a more broadly based review of Canada's approach to the Pacific region:

We shall be looking at our policy in relation to China in the context of a new interest in Pacific affairs generally. Because of past preoccupations with Atlantic and European affairs, we have tended to overlook the reality that Canada is a Pacific country too.42

Australia, added the secretary of state for external affairs, Mitchell Sharp, "will play a very important role in all this."43 The Australian foreign minister, Paul Hasluck, found Trudeau's interest in Asia encouraging; he and his officials were cautiously optimistic that the new government, unlike the old, might embrace the Australian perspective on the crises in Asia before proceeding to recognize China.

Despite objections from several Canadian allies, including Australia, Trudeau moved ahead with plans to recognize China. The war in Vietnam also continued to divide Ottawa and Canberra. Canadian efforts to strengthen its relationship with Australia as part of its plan to re-define itself as a Pacific nation ran aground on these differences. When Jean-Luc Pepin, the minister of industry, trade and commerce, sought Australian agreement for a regular program of ministerial visits in order to revitalize the relationship, he met with little interest. In dismissing Pepin's demarche, the Australian minister for foreign affairs was blunt: "[Canada] could not expect to make much headway in [its] relations with Pacific Rim countries if [it] persisted in seeking relations with Communist China."44

Trudeau himself fared little better when he visited Australia in June 1970 as part of an exercise to highlight the growing importance of the Pacific region in Canada. The continuing crisis in South-east Asia cast a long shadow over the discussions. Although Trudeau managed to secure a pledge from his Australian host "to hold high level consultations," it seemed clear that Australian officials and politicians were hardly enthusiastic about Canada and its new prime minister. When reviewing the visit with Arthur Menzies, Canada's long-serving and trusted high commissioner in Canberra, Australian politicians complained loudly that Trudeau had made no effort to understand Australia's perspective on Indo-China. Menzies' conclusion was disturbing: "Until circumstances arise in which some effective Canadian initiative can be taken in helping to end the hostilities in Indochina, I think that we will find ourselves still rather far apart from the Australians."45 Indeed, when Trudeau declared that the plug could be pulled on the Indian Ocean for all he cared, Australian officials made it clear that they "now wished that [Trudeau] had never concerned himself with them."46

Many of the differences separating the two countries disappeared suddenly in December 1972 when Gough Whitlam was elected prime minister of Australia's first labour government since the 1940s. Sceptical of Australian foreign policy, with its lingering loyalty to Britain and its faith in an American globalism that seemed woefully mismanaged, Whitlam was determined to seek a new direction for Australia. For at least part of his inspiration, he looked to Canada, which he had visited regularly during the 1960s as leader of the opposition. He especially admired Trudeau's determination to distance Canada from the United States and the clear sense of nationhood that guided Trudeau's efforts to modernize the Canadian constitution. The two politicians quickly developed an easy and natural rapport.

With Whitlam's encouragement, a stream of Australian officials travelled to Ottawa to learn about Canadian policy initiatives. These included the recognition of China, the new cabinet committee system, and policy on royal prerogatives and honours. Canadian officials were delighted to see this evidence of Australia's "exceptional" interest in Canada.47 Equally important, they were intrigued by Whitlam's effort to shape a more independent foreign policy, a project that seemed likely to increase Australia's role in the Pacific and to make it a more dynamic partner for Canada. The relationship was clearly "in the process of taking on new perspectives."48

Despite Labour's defeat in the 1975 general election, there was no need to qualify this assessment. Australia's conservative prime minister, Malcolm Fraser, seemed to adopt a harder line on cold war issues than his predecessor but shared Whitlam's determination to shape an independent foreign policy for Australia. Throughout the Pacific, Fraser's government aggressively pursued a strong set of regional and bilateral links with Japan, the ASEAN countries, South Korea and Communist China. The new prime minister also promoted a renewed Australian interest in the Commonwealth, which, he hoped, would provide Australia with an opportunity to fulfil its growing leadership aspirations.

Canadian officials occasionally worried about Australia's growing economic and political presence in the Pacific and in the Commonwealth. For instance, Paul Martin, now serving as Canada's high commissioner to Britain, fretted in 1979 that "Australia [would] steal a march over us" by assuming the lead in Commonwealth discussions on Southern Africa.49 But most Canadian observers were excited with Australia's re-emergence as a "like-minded middle power, willing to act decisively and constructively."50 Australia's enhanced profile in the Pacific confirmed Ottawa's inclination to view Australia as an increasingly important partner in Canada's efforts to increase trade with Japan and to ensure regional stability by supporting such organizations as ASEAN. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Canada and Australia found themselves comfortably aligned not only when dealing with such Pacific questions as Cambodia's civil war, but also when confronted by crises in Southern Africa, Afghanistan and Poland.

This successful multilateral partnership had its bilateral dimension as official and unofficial contacts between the two countries multiplied in the late 1970s. Growing interest in each other's cultural and intellectual life, for example, led to the creation of the Canada-Australia Literary Award in 1976. At the same time, comparative studies in the two countries were more clearly defined when the Canadian-Australian Colloquium, the Canadian visiting fellowship at Macquarie University, and the Australian Association for Canadian Studies were established in 1981. Similarly, official contacts increased dramatically. In the first two months of 1977 alone, for instance, the two governments signed agreements on the exchange of information regarding energy research, aboriginal peoples, and crime prevention and criminal justice. By 1980, there were official exchange programs between Canadian and Australian departments responsible for statistics, aboriginal people, labour, justice and defence. Australia's only complaint - a traditional one - was that far too few Canadian politicians visited Australia. The problem soon disappeared. In one 18-month period in 1979-1981, the premiers of Ontario, British Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan all travelled independently to Australia. They were followed by nine other federal and provincial cabinet ministers. In June 1981, the growing number of Canadian contacts with Australia prompted Ottawa to add a new consulate in Perth to its existing posts in Canberra, Melbourne and Sydney.

The sudden vigour of the relationship caught both countries by surprise. In neither capital did politicians and officials seem aware of the complete range of bilateral contacts and the possibilities for further cooperation. As a consequence, neither Australia nor Canada seemed able to measure the importance of individual issues against the value of the entire relationship. As the long postwar economic boom gave way to a series of recurring economic challenges in the late 1970s, both governments tended to scratch out economic advantage where they could. While Ottawa barred the importation of Australian meat to protect Canadian farmers, Canberra denied Canadian airlines landing rights in Australia. Some officials worried that the web of connections that bound the two countries together might be severed one at a time without anyone ever noticing:

If the process continues, in ten years' time there will be nothing left but the high-flown sentiments and a few sporadic exchanges of view at [Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings] and the United Nations. Like Alice's Cheshire Cat, nothing will remain but the smile.51

The solution clearly lay in creating some kind of mechanism that would ensure that individual issues, however important in themselves, were placed within the context of the broader relationship. Australian officials agreed. When the Australian foreign minister, Andrew Peacock, expressed keen interest in exploring new bilateral initiatives in 1980, Canada seized the occasion to press for a formal mechanism that would provide overall direction. Australia hesitated. Recalling an earlier and easier era, Canberra wondered whether more might be lost than gained in institutionalizing the relationship. In the end, Australia agreed that relations had become too important to be managed through simple ad hoc consultations. In September 1982, the two countries agreed to create a Senior Officials Committee (SOC) that would meet annually to oversee the relationship.

Senior officials from both countries met in Canberra for the first time in June 1983. The gathering, according to a Canadian report, appeared an immediate success:

Canadian-Australian policy talks [were] held...on relaxed and forthright basis and were adjudged to be successful and useful...Both sides saw value of talks in re-establishing or restoring very close working cooperation between Canada and Australia which had perhaps broken down a bit due to neglect.52

This robust assessment was perhaps overstated. Certainly, during the following decade, the SOC found it impossible to eliminate the tendency in both capitals to disregard the overall relationship in pursuit of more limited objectives. Similarly, the committee was not always able to bridge the very real differences that emerged in the 1980s over such questions as Pacific security or multilateral trade. What the committee did provide, however, was a framework and a context for partnership. Its very creation reflected a conscious decision by both Canada and Australia to pursue as mature and independent nations a relationship that began in the 1890s as a simple by-product of Britain's Victorian Empire.


I am grateful to John Hilliker, Norman Hillmer, Arthur Menzies and Mary Donaghy for their respective contributions to this paper. I am especially indebted to the late Ian M. Drummond for his help with Mackenzie King's economic policy.


1. P. Slyfield, "Trade and Communications with Australia and New Zealand, 1892-1911," Record Group (RG) 20, Vol 1417, File 424, National Archives of Canada (NAC).

2. O. Mary Hill, Canada's Salesman to the World: The Department of Trade and Commerce, 1892-1939 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977), pp. 44-45, 72-73.

3. P. Slyfield, "Trade and Communications with Australian and New Zealand, 1892-1911," RG 20, Vol 1417, File 424, NAC.

4. Ibid.

5. "Concise History of the Negotiations in Regard to Reciprocal Trade since 1900 with the Australian Commonwealth", Laurier Papers, Vol 654, NAC. See also O. Mary Hill, Canada's Salesman to the World, p. 79.

6. K.A. MacKirdy, "Canadian and Australia Self-interest, the American Fact, and the Development of the Commonwealth Idea," in H.L. Dyck and H.P. Krosby, (eds.), Empire and Nations: Essays in honour of Frederic H. Soward (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), p. 123.

7. John Edward Kendle, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences, 1887-1911 (London: Royal Commonwealth Society, 1967), p. 91.

8. Philip Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth: British-Canadian Relations 1917-1926 (New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 42.

9. C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict: A History of Canadian Policies, Volume One: 1867-1921, (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1977), pp. 341-42.

10. Ibid, pp. 342-43.

11. Philip Wigley, Canada and the Transition to Commonwealth, p. 185.

12. Ibid, p. 193.

13. Ibid, p. 193.

14. W.J. Hudson and Jane North (eds.) My Dear P.M.: R.G. Casey's Letters to S.M. Bruce, 1924-1929 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1980), p. 336.

15. W.J. Hudson and Wendy Way, (eds.) Letters from a 'Secret Service Agent': F.L. McDougall to S.M. Bruce, 1924-29 (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986), p. 827.

16. [J.S. MacDonald], "Tariff Negotiations Between Canada and Australia," [November 1937], RG 25, Volume 1578, File 158-1931, NAC.

17. Canadian and Australian negotiators were unable to improve on this 1931 trade agreement during their bilateral discussions at the 1932 Imperial Economic Conference in Ottawa. As a result, among the participants at that conference, only Canada and Australia did not sign a new trade pact.

18. Ibid.

19. Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 28 May 1937, reprinted in John A. Munro, (ed) Documents on Canadian External Relations (DCER) Vol 6 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972), p. 331.

20. Prime Minister of Canada to the Prime Minister of Australia, 11 January 1935; Prime Minister of Australia to the Prime Minister of Canada, 13 February 1935, RG 25, Vol 1734, File 1935-117, NAC.

21. See, for example, Sir Herbert Marler to O.D. Skelton, 4 February 1937; O.D. Skelton to Marler, 6 February 1937, RG 25, Vol 1834, File 1937-319, NAC.

22. Mr. F.K. Officer, Australian Counsellor to the United Kingdom Embassy in Washington to Mr. R.G. Casey, Treasurer, 25 January 1939, reprinted in R.G. Neale (ed.) Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, 1937-49 (DAFP), (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976), p. 26.

23. J.F. Hilliker, "Distant Ally: Canadian Relations With Australia During the Second World War," Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 13, no. 1 (October 1984), pp. 51-52.

24. E.B. Rogers to Norman Robertson, 20 October 1942, RG 25, Vol 3116, File 4533-30, NAC.

25. John W. Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order 1943-1957, Vol. 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), p. 44.

26. Nicholas Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience: From British to Multiracial Commonwealth (Revised Edition) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), p. 102.

27. James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: Peacemaking and Deterrence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 158.

28. Paul Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness: Australian Foreign Affairs, 1941-47, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1980), p. 195.

29. L.B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson, Volume 2: 1948-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), p. 103.

30. "Australian Policy on Current Domestic and International Issues," 31 October 1950, RG 25, Vol 3116, File 4533-40, NAC.

31. Douglas LePan, Bright Glass of Memory: A Set of Four Memoirs (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979), p. 198. For an Australian view, see Sir Percy Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1969).

32. R.G. Casey to L.P. Pearson, 12 June 1951, Pearson Papers, Man.uscript Group (MG) 26, N1, Vol 2, NAC.

33. L.B. Pearson, "Memorandum for the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs," 7 November 1951, RG 25, Accession 86-89/160, Box 38, File 4533-40; L.B. Pearson to Arthur Irwin, 25 August 1956, Pearson Papers, MG 26, N1, Vol 2, NAC.

34. Secretary of State for External Affairs to the Canadian High Commissioner in Canberra, Despatch No K-574, 18 December 1951, RG 25, Accession 86-87/160, Box 38, File 4533-40, NAC. For Casey's view of Canadian officials, see T.B. Millar (ed.), Australian Foreign Minister: The Diaries of R.G. Casey, 1951-1960 (London: Collins, 1972), passim.

35. "Memorandum: Australia and Canada," [October 1957], RG 25, Accession 86-87/160, Box 38, File 4533-40, NAC; Arthur Blanchette, "Indochina: From Desk Officer to Acting Commissioner", unpublished manuscript, p. 14.

36. The Times of London, 30 November 1959.

37. The Montreal Star, 7 April 1956.

38. The Times of London, 30 November 1959.

39. "Memorandum: Australia and Canada," 1 June 1964 and marginalia, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) File 20-1-2-Australia.

40. Sir Robert Menzies, Afternoon Light: Some Memories of Men and Events (London: Cassells, 1967), p. 189.

41. Arthur Menzies, "Notes for a talk by the high Commissioner, A.R. Menzies at the Annual Staff Meeting, 5 December 1968," DFAIT File 20-1-2-Australia.

42. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, "Canada and the World," 29 May 1968, Statements and Speeches, No. 68/17.

43. Mitchell Sharp to Arthur Menzies, 14 June 1968, DFAIT File 20-1-2-Australia.

44. Canadian High Commissioner in Canberra to SSEA, Telegram No. 1186, 25 August 1969, DFAIT File 20-1-2-Australia.

45. Canadian High Commissioner in Canberra to USSEA, 26 June 1970, Letter No. 852, DFAIT File 20-1-2-Australia.

46. Canadian High Commissioner in Canberra to SSEA, Telegram No. 73, 19 January 1971, DFAIT File 20-1-2-Australia.

47. "Informal Visit of Prime Minister Whitlam of Australia to Canada, 4-5 October 1974: Background Notes," [October 1974], DFAIT File 20-1-2-Australia.

48. A. Park, "Briefing Notes for Ivan Head: Australia," 5 February 1973, DFAIT File 20-1-2-Australia.

49. Paul Martin, The London Diaries, 1975-1979 (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1988), p. 536.

50. USSEA to Canadian High Commission in Canberra, 8 April 1980, Letter No GPL 363, DFAIT File 20-1-2-Australia.

51. W.T. Delworth, Director-General, Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs to J.H. Taylor, Assistant Deputy Minister, Memorandum No GPP-455, 4 October 1979, DFAIT File 20-1-2-Australia.

52. Canadian High Commissioner in Canberra to SSEA, Tel No YAGR 0988, 23 June 1983, DFAIT File 20-1-2-Australia.